Ranked Approval Compromise Exception: Difference between revisions
Ranked Approval Compromise Exception (view source)
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Thus, in the example, C will win.
The logic here is that even though a slim majority might prefer the standard winner, we can tell because of their high approval level for the compromise, that they will not, as a group, be too upset if that compromise wins; we check the approval level among the remainder of the population
One side effect of the compromise exception is to discourage one form of [[strategic voting]] in [[Definite Majority Choice]], and potentially other methods based on ranking and approval data. It has been suggested by Jeff Fisher that voters in DMC would come to routinely approve any candidate they expect their favorite to defeat in pairwise rankings, because even if this leads the candidate to have no double-defeats, they will be beaten in the final selection by the favorite, and in the meantime they may produce a double-defeat against some other candidate that threatened the favorite. With the compromise exception, voters opting for this strategy would run a serious risk of inflating the dishonestly approved candidate's approval score to the point that the exception would come into play. Thus, it acts as a strong disincentive to approve dishonestly.
This concept was originally proposed by David Scotese, as a refinement of a method equivalent to [[Condorcet//Approval|Smith//Approval]] that had been suggested by R.M. "Auros" Harman. Scotese's "Condorcet Versus Approval" was refined by Harman to produce the version described above.
[[Category:Voting method features]]
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