Ranked Pairs: Difference between revisions

(Moved some of the Notes to an advantages and disadvantages section, and added Munger paper advocating for RP.)
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== Advantages and disadvantages ==
 
Ranked Pairs is [[Smith-efficient]], because no Smith set member can be beaten by a candidate not in the Smith set,. andAs thereforea result, any candidate not in the Smith set can'twill not have their defeats to Smith set members discarded during the RP procedure, so they can't become the Condorcet winner.
 
Ranked Pairs passes the [[Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives]] criterion, because the only cycles for RP to potentially resolve will always be between Smith set members. Because of this, all candidates not in the Smith set can be eliminated before starting the procedure, reducing the number of operations needed to be done to find the winner. In addition, Ranked Pairs, like [[Schulze]], is equivalent to [[Minimax]] when there are 3 or fewer candidates with no pairwise ties between them, so if the Smith set has 3 or fewer candidates in it with no pairwise ties between them, [[Smith//Minimax]] can be run instead to find/demonstrate the RP winner.
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While Ranked Pairs behaves similarly to [[Schulze]], Ranked Pairs passes [[local independence of irrelevant alternatives]] whereas Schulze does not. Some authors argue that the Ranked Pairs method is more intuitive and easier to understand than Schulze as well.<ref name="Munger 2023 pp. 434–444">{{cite journal | last=Munger | first=Charles T. | title=The best Condorcet-compatible election method: Ranked Pairs | journal=Constitutional Political Economy | volume=34 | issue=3 | date=2023 | issn=1043-4062 | doi=10.1007/s10602-022-09382-w | pages=434–444}}</ref>
 
One disadvantage of Ranked Pairs is that there's no easy way to detect ties for first place:, as determining whether there exists a way to break ties between pairwise victories so that a given candidate wins is NP-complete.<ref name="Brill">{{cite journal | last=Brill | first=Markus | last2=Fischer | first2=Felix | title=The Price of Neutrality for the Ranked Pairs Method | journal=Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence | publisher=Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) | volume=26 | issue=1 | date=2012-07-26 | issn=2374-3468 | doi=10.1609/aaai.v26i1.8250 | pages=1299–1305}}</ref>. WhileHowever, itties iscan possiblestill tobe break pairwise tiesbroken fairly, doingand soefficiently leads(using Rankedsome Pairssecondary tomethod declarebased one ofon the winners the sole winnerballots, withoutsuch givingas informationselecting aboutthe whethercandidate otherwith candidatesthe could[[Graduated haveMajority wonJudgment|highest weremedian the ties broken differentlyscore]]).
 
 
== Notes ==