Ranked voting: Difference between revisions

no edit summary
No edit summary
Line 28:
 
[[Score voting]] takes this a step further by allowing voters to vary their degree of approval; in some sense, this can be seen in the ranked context by first using the [[KP transform]] and then converting the resulting Approval ballots into ranked ballots as mentioned above. This allows voters to essentially "vote against themselves" in certain matchups or otherwise split their ballot up in such a way that only a fraction of it shows a preference between certain candidates, while the rest of the ballot is treated as indifferent between those candidates i.e. a voter giving 100% support to A, 70% to B, and 10% for C is treated as 10% of an A=B=C voter, 60% of an A=B voter, and 30% of an A voter, thus allowing them to have, for example, only 60% of their ballot showing preference for B>C, rather than 100%. Again, the same "the strength of X>Z is equal to X>Y plus Y>Z" beat-or-tie path consistency is achieved here; if analyzing the A vs C matchup, the voter gives 90% of their ballot to A>C and 10% to A=C, so they are in effect giving 0.9 votes to A>C. This equals the strength of the A vs B matchup (0.3 votes for A>B, since the voter gives 30% of their ballot to A>B and 70% to A=B) plus the B vs C matchup (60% or 0.6 votes for B>C, as mentioned above).
 
== Discussion ==
It is worth considering what a ranked method's "approval case" looks like. This is when, if equal rankings are permitted, all voters rank every candidate either 1st or last. Many ranked methods become [[Approval voting]] in their approval case i.e. the candidate with the most 1st choices wins (sometimes this depends on how equal-rankings are implemented); for example, all [[Smith-efficient]] [[Condorcet methods]], [[Borda]], [[IRV]] with [[Equal-ranking methods in IRV|whole votes equal-ranking]], etc.
 
== References ==