Reciprocal Score Voting: Difference between revisions
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* If any of the top choices is not the front-runner, the optimal strategy is to equally top-rate every "underdog" candidate deemed better than the front-runner (especially the favorite), and rating every other preferred candidate in order of perceived "viability". That is, the preferred front-runner would be rated as highly as possible below the favorite "underdogs", in order to maximize the support they receive from the front-runner's faction. Since the front-runner's faction is also encouraged to support the underdogs as much as possible, as per above, this is beneficial to all cooperating factions.
Thus, under strategy in RSV, factions which mutually collaborate have an advantage over opposing factions which are fragmented and uncooperative.
=== Exaggerated approval-like voting ===
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