STLR voting: Difference between revisions

The concept was invented by [[Equal Vote Coalition]] Director [[Keith Edmonds]] and was first proposed publicly in July 2020<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://forum.electionscience.org/t/a-new-star-variant/708/28|title=CES Forum Post|last=|first=|date=Monday, August 3, 2020 at 7:40:16 PM Coordinated Universal Time|website=forum.electionscience.org|url-status=livedead|archive-url=https://www.votingtheory.org/archive/posts?where=%7B%22topic_id%22%3A708%7D|archive-date=?|access-date=2022-08-14|publisher=VotingTheory.org}}</ref>.

The originally proposed runoff method was not levelling but the normalization from [[Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings]] (IRNR). Levelling chosen to be better shortly after. The version with IRNR normalization was previously and independently invented by user lucasvb on Reddit<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/bl6zrq/score_then_automatic_cumulative_runoff/|title=score_then_automatic_cumulative_runoff|last=|first=|date=May 6, 2019|website=|url-status=livedead|archive-url=https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache%3Ahttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.reddit.com%2Fr%2FEndFPTP%2Fcomments%2Fbl6zrq%2Fscore_then_automatic_cumulative_runoff%2F|archive-date=2022-05-01|access-date=2022-08-14}}</ref>. The idea came from an attempt to solve the issue of arbitrary scale in [[Score voting]]. [[STAR voting]] solves this with the majoritarian runoff but as a result makes the system a majoritarian system.

When analyzing the ballots from the French studies<ref>“How voters use grade scales in evaluative voting” European Journal of Political Economy 55 (2018) 14–28, doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.09.006, Baujard, Gavrel, Igersheim, Laslier, and Lebon.</ref> <ref>Baujard, Antoinette & Igersheim, Herrade & Lebon, Isabelle & Gavrel, Frederic & Laslier, Jean-Francois. (2013). Who's Favored by Evaluative Voting? An Experiment Conducted During the 2012 French Presidential Election. Electoral Studies. 34. 10.1016/j.electstud.2013.11.003. </ref> and primary election for the Independent Party of Oregon <ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.kdrv.com/content/news/Oregon-Independent-voters-favor-Biden-over-Trump-but-other-Republicans-over-Democrats-570644271.html|title=Oregon Independent voters favour Biden over Trump|last=|first=|date=|website=|url-status=livedead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200528205542/https://www.kdrv.com/content/news/Oregon-Independent-voters-favor-Biden-over-Trump-but-other-Republicans-over-Democrats-570644271.html|archive-date=2020-05-28|access-date=2022-08-14}}</ref> a well known criticism of score voting arose. This is that some voters tend to be too honest and to not score any candidate at the <math>MAX</math> and <math>MIN</math> values. In a score election the amount of influence a voter has is the difference between the maximum and minimum score they give a candidate. The standard response is that voters are told how the system works and it is up to them to decide how to use the scores.

STAR is intended to be a compromise between [[score voting]] and [[instant runoff voting]].<ref>{{Cite news |url = http://equal.vote |title = Equal Vote Coalition |work = Equal Vote Coalition |access-date = 2017-04-05 }}</ref>. It solves the above issue of scale because as long as a preference is shown between the two candidates in the runoff, then their influence is maximized. It is a majoritarian system as shown in the example

Suppose a voter in a [0,5] system gave candidates A, B and C the following scores; A:5, B:1, C:0. Clearly A is their favourite and they have expressed this. However, if A is unviable and the top two are B and C they have ruined their influence by giving B only a score of 1. Proponents of score voting arbgueargue that an informed voter should know the polling data and vote strategically as A:5, B:5, C:0. This is wrong for two reasons. Firstly, incentive to vote dishonestly should never be encouraged. Secondly, polls can be wrong or manipulated. If B was supported by the media then they could have their standing inflated so that people would vote for them as a lesser evil. In both STLR and STAR voting. The runoff between B and C converts the ballot to B:5, C:0 without any need for the voter to vote strategically.