Sequential Monroe voting: Difference between revisions

Sequential Monroe (SMV) is a sequential [[Multi-Member System]] created<ref>https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/auyxny/can_anyone_give_a_summary_of_multiwinner_methods/ehgkfbl/</ref> by Parker Friedland that is built on [[Score voting]]. Each winner is that candidate whowith whichthe highest sumpossible sum-of -score in a [[Hare Quota]] of the remaining ballots. That Hare quota of ballots is then removed from subsequent rounds.

#Calculate the sum of score given to X on the first [[Quota | hare quota]] of ballot weight. Record this score as that candidate's hare quota score

#Set the ballot weight to zero for the voters that contribute to that candidate's [[Quota | hare quota]] score.

'''[[Fractional Surplus Handling]]''' is used to break ties''':. whenWhen calculating which ballots belong to a candidate's quota, if, for a particular score, including voters that gave that candidate that score in the quota would make the quota totoo large, and excluding it would make it to small, exhaust a portion of those vote's weights such that the total weight of the exhausted ballots still equals the hare quota. The reason why [[Fractional Surplus Handling]] is preferred is that it preserves the [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives]] and [[Monotonicity]] criteria that Monroe's method passes).

SMV passes a stronger property related to [[PSC|Proportionality for Solid Coalitions]]-related property than most cardinal PR methods: a solid coalition comprising k Hare quotas can force the election of at least k of their preferred candidates by max-scoring them; this is because their preferred candidates will have the highest possible Monroe scores, since they have maximal support from their most-supporting Hare quota of voters. Most other cardinal PR methods further require that the solid coalition min-score all non-preferred candidates in order to receive this guarantee.

[[Category:Largest remainder-reducing voting methodmethods]]