Anonymous user
Sequential Monroe voting: Difference between revisions
no edit summary
(Crediting myself) |
No edit summary |
||
Line 1:
Sequential Monroe (SMV) is sequential [[Multi-Member System]] created<ref>https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/auyxny/can_anyone_give_a_summary_of_multiwinner_methods/ehgkfbl/</ref> by Parker Friedland that is built on [[Score voting]]. Each winner is that candidate who which highest sum of score in a [[Hare Quota]] of ballots. That Hare quota of ballots is then removed from subsequent rounds.
==Discussion==
Line 19:
'''Fractional Surplus Handling to break ties''': when calculating which ballots belong to a candidate's quota, if for a particular score including voters that gave that candidate that score in the quota would make the quota to large and excluding it would make it to small, exhaust a portion of those vote's weights such that the total weight of the exhausted ballots still equals the hare quota. The reason why [[Fractional Surplus Handling]] is preferred is that it preserves the [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives]] and [[Monotonicity]] criteria that Monroe's method passes).
== Properties ==
SMV passes a stronger [[PSC]]-related property than most cardinal PR methods: a solid coalition comprising k Hare quotas can force the election of at least k of their preferred candidates by max-scoring them. Most other cardinal PR methods further require that the solid coalition min-score all non-preferred candidates in order to receive this guarantee.
[[Category:Cardinal voting methods]]
[[Category:Proportional voting methods]]
| |||