Single transferable vote: Difference between revisions

Note that giving a vote to each equally-top ranked candidate can lead to different results when using either the "if in any round any candidate gets a quota (if using a quota that is equal to or larger than a Droop quota, a majority, in the single-winner case) they win" rule or the "while using quota-based election and surplus distribution when relevant, all but ((number of winners) + 1) candidates must be eliminated, andwith thenthe all(number remainingof winners) candidates winwith the most votes then winning" rule (this rulewhich can also be thought of as "eliminateincluding allquota-based butelection ((#and of winners)surplus + 1) candidatesdistribution, andall then elect thebut (#number of winners) remaining candidates must be eliminated, with the mostremaining votescandidates winning"). Single-winner example: 45 A=C>B, 35 B>A>C, 20 C>B>A. If the first rule is used (modified to also say "if multiple candidates have Droop quotas in the same round, the candidates with the largest Droop quotas win."), then C wins, whereas under the second rule A wins. The second rule can actually create greater possibility for [[Tactical voting#Types of tactical voting|pushover]] strategy, since it could have been the case the A=C>B voters' honest preferences were A>B>C, and if they had voted their honest preference, B would've won, a worse result from their point of view. Also, this can lead to different results when using either the "all candidates who reach quota are elected" rule or the "the candidate who most exceeds the quota is elected, then spend their ballots, and repeat" rule. 3-winner example with Droop quotas: 34 A=B=C, 33 D 33 E. A, B, and C win under the former rule, while A, D, and F win under the latter rule.