Single transferable vote: Difference between revisions

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* Giving one vote to each equally-top-ranked candidate. Can optionally be combined with a suggestion that ballots that equally rank candidates shouldn't be able to prevent the elimination of those candidates.<ref name="reddit 2011">{{cite web | title=Proportionality failure in STV with equal-ranks with whole votes : EndFPTP | website=reddit | date=2019-12-05 | url=https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/e6bt6s/proportionality_failure_in_stv_with_equalranks/f9thuy4/?context=8&depth=9 | access-date=2020-02-10}}</ref>
 
Note that in the single-winner case, giving a vote to each equally-top ranked candidate can lead to different results when using either the "if in any round any candidate gets a quota (if using a quota that is equal to or larger than a Droop quota, a majority, in the single-winner case) they win" rule or the "while using quota-based election and surplus distribution when relevant, all but ((number of winners) + 1) candidates must be eliminated, with the (number of winners) candidatescandidate(s) with the most votes then winning" rule (which can also be thought of as "including quota-based election and surplus distribution, all but (number of winners) candidates must be eliminated, with the remaining candidatescandidate(s) winning"). Single-winner example: 45 A=C<blockquote>B, 35 B>A>C, 20 C>B>A. If the first rule is used (modified to also say "if multiple candidates have Droop quotas in the same round, the candidates with the largest Droop quotas win."), then C wins, whereas under the second rule A wins. The second rule can actually create greater possibility for [[Tactical voting#Types of tactical voting|pushover]] strategy, since it could have been the case the45 A=C>B voters' honest preferences were A>B>C, and if they had voted their honest preference, B would've won, a worse result from their point of view. Also, this can lead to different results when using either the "all candidates who reach quota are elected" rule or the "the candidate who most exceeds the quota is elected, then spend their ballots, and repeat" rule. 3-winner example with Droop quotas: 34 A=B=C, 33 D 33 E. A, B, and C win under the former rule, while A, D, and F win under the latter rule.
 
35 B>A>C
 
20 C>B>A </blockquote>If the first rule is used (modified to also say "if multiple candidates have Droop quotas in the same round, the candidate(s) with the largest Droop quotas win"), then C wins with 65 votes to start off with, whereas under the second rule, B is eliminated, and then A wins. The second rule can actually create greater possibility for [[Tactical voting#Types of tactical voting|pushover]] strategy, since it could have been the case the A=C>B voters' honest preferences were A>B>C, and if they had voted their honest preference, C would've been eliminated and then B would've won, a worse result from their point of view.
 
Also, this can lead to different results when using either the "all candidates who reach quota are elected" rule or the "the candidate who most exceeds the quota is elected, then spend their ballots, and repeat" rule. 3-winner example with Droop quotas: <blockquote>34 A=B=C
 
33 D
 
33 E </blockquote>A, B, and C win under the former rule, while A, D, and E win under the latter rule.
 
=== Methods of transferring excess votes ===