Smith criterion: Difference between revisions
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Note that this should be considered as only one of several conditions a voting methods should pass to be considered a Smith-efficient Condorcet PR method, since Bloc Score Voting passes it yet is not proportional or a Condorcet method.
== Notes ==
One way to argue for the Smith criterion is that not electing from the Smith set means a plurality of voters, who would presumably have the power to force their preferred candidate in the Smith set to beat whoever actually won in many voting methods, do not get their preference. In essence, it's a criterion that makes the most sense for voters who want maximal power. However, note that the Smith set itself can be made more [[Utilitarianism|utilitarian]] if voters tend to express weak preferences as equal rankings, or are allowed to express weak preferences in the head-to-head matchups. See [[Ballot#Notes]] and [[Asset voting]] for discussion on this.
[[Category:Voting system criteria]]
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