Smith criterion: Difference between revisions
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== Notes ==
One way to argue for the Smith criterion is that not electing from the Smith set means a plurality of voters, who would presumably have the power to force their preferred candidate in the Smith set to beat whoever actually won in many voting methods, do not get their preference. In essence, it's a criterion that makes the most sense for voters who want maximal power. However, note that the Smith set itself can be made more [[Utilitarianism|utilitarian]] if voters tend to express weak preferences as equal rankings, or are allowed to express weak preferences in the head-to-head matchups. See [[Ballot#Notes]] and [[Asset voting]] for discussion on this.
The Smith criterion can alternatively be worded as "any time the candidates can be split into two groups such that every candidate in the first group pairwise beats every candidate in the second group, then one of the candidates in the first group must win."
== References ==
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