Stable winner set: Difference between revisions

Interestingly, the two varying modes of deciding which set a voter prefers in each pairwise matchup (evaluate a voter's preference between sets as based either on, first whether they have a more-preferred candidate in one set and then second more of their more-preferred candidates in that set, or as being based on which set gives more utility), as well as the discussion over whether to use Droop Quotas vs. Hare Quotas within the formula, has already been used before for Condorcet PR methods:<blockquote>We deferred the question of how to decide whether a voter prefers one set of ''f'' candidates over another, where a set of candidates is a subset of a committee. In proportional representation mode, there is only one difference from the voter's perspective. The voting algorithm decides which of two committees would be preferred by a candidate using one of two criteria, ''combined weights'' or ''best candidate''.</blockquote><blockquote>The factor (''k''+1) may be surprising in the condition for proportional validity, but it actually agrees with proportional representation election methods developed elsewhere; it is analogous to the Droop quota used by many STV election methods.<ref name=":0" /></blockquote>

 

 

* [https://arxiv.org/abs/1910.14008 Approximately Stable Committee Selection]

* [https://www.jstor.org/stable/1909241?seq=1 Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods ]

* https://www.participatorybudgeting.org/

 

[[Category:Voting system criteria]]