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Strategic nomination: Difference between revisions
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'''Strategic nomination''' is the manipulation of an
Obviously, if the winner of an election wasn't running in the first place then somebody else would have won instead and if a candidate gets "added" to an election it should be possible that this candidate now wins. If these are the only cases in which a change in the candidate set leads to a different election outcome, then the [[voting system]] is [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives|independent of irrelevant alternatives]] and therefore immune to strategic nomination.
'''Independence of irrelevant alternatives''', however, is a very hard property to satisfy (satisfied, for one, by cardinal or average ratings). This is illustrated by the following example of Condorcet's [[voting paradox]]:
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Although the real existence of clones is nearly impossible as it only takes one voter to create a differentiation between two candidates, the behavior an election method shows with regard to clones will tend to apply gracefully when it comes to near-clone situations (unless the election system was a deliberately contrived construction, e.g. a [[Borda count|Borda election]] after a purging of clones).
==External links==
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[[Category:Voting theory]]
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