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Strategy-free criterion: Difference between revisions
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prefers this candidate to another candidate, then the other candidate should
not win if that majority votes sincerely and no other voter falsifies
any preferences.
[[Category:Voting system criteria]]▼
▲<h4 class=left>Complying Methods</h4>
*'''Complies''': [[Cloneproof Schwartz Sequential Dropping]]
possibly <em>not</em> be preferred by a majority of voters over any
other candidate. The key is that some voters may have no preference
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prefer the opposite, with the other 15 having no preference between the
two. In that case, it is not true that a majority of voters prefer the
Condorcet candidate over the other candidate, and SFC does not apply.
two types of insincere votes: false preferences and truncated
preferences. Voters <em>truncate</em> by terminating their rank list
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voter's true preferences are (A,B,C,D). The vote (A) or (A,B) would be a
truncated vote, and the vote (B,A,C) or (A,C,B) would be a falsified
vote.
another particular candidate vote sincerely (neither falsify nor
truncate their preferences), and it also requires that no other voter
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that is more likely to backfire than to succeed.) The significance of
the SFC guarantee is that the majority has no need for defensive
strategy, hence the name Strategy-Free Criterion.
Condorcet and Generalized Condorcet Criteria (CC and GCC) above.
Although compliance with CC and GCC are important, those criteria apply
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reasonable conditions, a majority of voters have no incentive to vote
insincerely. The fact that [[Cloneproof Schwartz Sequential Dropping]] also complies with SFC
therefore enhances the significance of CC and GCC considerably.
''Some parts of this article are derived with permission from text at http://electionmethods.org''
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▲[[Category:Voting system criteria]]
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