Strategy-free criterion: Difference between revisions

→‎Commentary: clean up (AWB)
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The reader may be wondering how the Condorcet candidate, if one exists, could
possibly <em>''not</em>'' be preferred by a majority of voters over any
other candidate. The key is that some voters may have no preference
between a given pair of candidates. Out of 100 voters, for example, 45
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In order to understand SFC, one must also understand that there are
two types of insincere votes: false preferences and truncated
preferences. Voters <em>''truncate</em>'' by terminating their rank list
before their true preferences are fully specified (note that the last
choice is always implied, so leaving it out is not considered
truncation). Voters <em>''falsify</em>'' their preferences, on the other
hand, by reversing the order of their true preferences or by specifying
a preference they don't really have. Suppose, for example, that a
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candidate to win by truncating their preferences. (In theory, that
minority could cause the other candidate to win by falsifying their
preferences, but that would be a very risky <em>''offensive</em>'' strategy
that is more likely to backfire than to succeed.) The significance of
the SFC guarantee is that the majority has no need for defensive