Summed-Ranks: Difference between revisions
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'''Summed-Ranks''' (abbreviated '''SR''') is a ranked voting method.
Rankings may be of any length, ranking as many or as few candidates as desired. Several candidates can be ranked at
▲Rankings may be of any length, ranking as many or as few candidates as desired. Several candidates can be ranked at a same rank position.
The winner is the candidate with the fewest candidates ranked over him/her, as summed over all of the ballots.
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Each candidate bottom-ranked on a ballot is counted as having all candidates, including all of that ballot's other bottom-ranked candidates, ranked over him/her on that ballot.
== Analysis ==
SR meets criteria not met by other Borda versions. These are listed and defined below:
A ballot votes a candidate at top if it votes that candidate over someone, and doesn't vote anyone over that candidate.
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FBC is important because "favorite-burial", voting other candidates over one's favorite, drastically distorts public wishes and preferences, with obvious seriously adverse societal results.
If some candidates have been voted-for on a ballot, then causing the winner to be one of those already voted-for should never require voting for additional candidates on that ballot.
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Because of SR's LNHe compliance, SR never gives incentive or need to rank unacceptable candidates. If the most important goal is to keep the winner from coming from a certain set, then, for that goal, it it's never necessary to rank any member of that set.
=== Others ===
In addition to Participation, SR passes Participation's more-easily-passed variations:
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SR greatly alleviates the typical Borda clone problem. In ordinary Borda, it's advantageous for a faction or party to nominate many
But SR's treatment of bottom-ranked candidates penalizes that large number of identical candidates, on ballots that bottom-rank them.
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SR's method-chosen ratings for each rank position can be regarded as approximations to the ratings that voters would assign in Score--but voters are relieved of the task of rating. In that way, SR approximates Score's social-utility maximization under sincere voting, and Score's fractional ratings due to uncertainty or for defection-deterrence in a divided majority.
SR is for when it's desired to give voters the simple instruction to mark 1st choice(s), 2nd choice(s), etc., instead of asking them to rate the candidates or alternatives, and the number of alternatives is prohibitively large for a Condorcet
It has been argued that a
SR's uniquely simple definition and count rule are also an acceptance-advantage over other rank methods.
[[Category:Preferential voting methods]]
[[Category:Single-winner voting methods]]
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