Summed-Ranks: Difference between revisions
clean up (AWB), typos fixed: easily- → easily , shoudln't → shouldn't, it it → it is
Psephomancy (talk | contribs) (add definition template) |
Psephomancy (talk | contribs) (clean up (AWB), typos fixed: easily- → easily , shoudln't → shouldn't, it it → it is) |
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Later-No-Help is abbreviated "LNHe".
Because of SR's LNHe compliance, SR never gives incentive or need to rank unacceptable candidates. If the most important goal is to keep the winner from coming from a certain set, then, for that goal, it
=== Others ===
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Mono-Add-Unique-Top:
Adding a ballot that votes X over everyone else
Instant Runoff, Majority-Judgment, and all Condorcet versions, fail Participation, Mono-Add-Top, and Mono-Add-Unique-Top.
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Summed-Ranks (SR) is a relatively new proposal, and likely hasn't been used.
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SR greatly alleviates the typical Borda clone problem. In ordinary Borda, it's advantageous for a faction or party to nominate many identical candidates. Even when the alternatives-set is fixed, sets of very similar alternatives are favored.
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SR's count labor is proportional only to the first power of the number of candidates. It's only necessary to make one pass through each ballot.
SR's method-chosen ratings for each rank position can be regarded as approximations to the ratings that voters would assign in
SR is for when it's desired to give voters the simple instruction to mark 1st choice(s), 2nd choice(s), etc., instead of asking them to rate the candidates or alternatives, and the number of alternatives is prohibitively large for a Condorcet hand count, and a Condorcet-programmed computer isn't available to do the count.
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