Tactical voting: Difference between revisions
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== Notes ==
It's important to differentiate between ''coordinated'' strategy, and ''uncoordinated'' strategy, as well as informed strategy vs. uninformed strategy. For example, [[Approval voting]] and [[Score voting]] guarantee that at least half of the voters can force their preferred candidates to tie or win, and force their dispreferred candidates to tie or lose. However, this crucially hinges on these half of the voters of voters knowing a) that they all prefer those candidates, and b) that they all plan to use the strategy. Otherwise, those who attempt the strategy may either fail to support all of the candidates supported by the group of voters, resulting in the strategy not always working, or they may do it while not everyone else in the group does, which potentially weakens their own vote's ability to influence who wins among the candidates not maximally preferred by that half of the voters. So strategy comes in difficulty levels of execution.
An important thing to consider with strategic voting is how difficult it is for voters to figure out how to strategically vote. Distinctions are made between zero-info strategy (strategy that can be applied to get a better result without any information of other voters' preferences) and strategies that revolve around having various amounts of (accurate) polling information. In addition, the likelihood of a strategy working, and the risk/amount of harm (see [[utility]]) coming from it backfiring is also studied. Another common measure of a voting method's resistance to strategic voting is manipulability, which measures how often a voter or group of voters can vote strategically to improve the election results from their point of view.
==See also==
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