Tactical voting: Difference between revisions
→Burying
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40 C </blockquote>A is the [[Condorcet winner]] here ([[Pairwise beat|pairwise beats]] B 30 to 25 and C 55 to 40). But if A-top voters vote A>C instead, then they can make A win in several [[Condorcet methods]], such as [[Schulze]], [[Minimax]], etc. This is because they start a [[Condorcet cycle]] where A has the weakest pairwise defeat of the three (A loses 30 to 40 to C, while B loses 25 to 70 to C and C loses 40 to 55 to A). This is an example of the [[chicken dilemma]].
Burying is often discussed in the context of [[Condorcet methods]], where it can be used to create strategic [[Condorcet cycle]]<nowiki/>s. Also see [[later-no-help]] for some examples of burying.
=== Pushover ===
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