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Tactical voting: Difference between revisions
→Views on tactical voting: Arrows Theorem does not apply to *any* voting system.
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(→Views on tactical voting: Arrows Theorem does not apply to *any* voting system.) |
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: "Tactical voting is fine in theory and as an intellectual discussion in the drawing room or living rooms around the country, but when you actually get to polling day and you have to vote against your principles, then it is much harder to do".
While most agree that tactical voting is generally a problem, there are some cases when a strictly limited amount of it may bring about an more democratic result. Since [[Arrow's impossibility theorem]] proves that any ordinal (ranked choice) voting system is arguably undemocratic in at least some case, tactical voting may be used to correct such flaws. For instance, under purely honest voting, [[Condorcet method]]-like systems tend to settle on compromise candidates, while [[Instant-Runoff Voting]] favors those candidates which have strong core support - who may often be more extremist. An electorate using one of these two systems but which (in the general or the specific case) preferred the characteristics of the other system could consciously use strategy to achieve a result more characteristic of the other system. Under Condorcet, they may be able to win by "burying" the compromise candidate (although this risks throwing the election to the opposing extreme); while under IRV, they could always "compromise".
The problem is that such tactical voting would tend to overshoot and give undesired results. This greatly complicates the comparative analysis of voting systems. If tactical voting were to become significant, the perceived "advantages" of a given voting system could turn into disadvantages - and, more surprisingly, vice versa.
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