Tactical voting: Difference between revisions
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Due to the especially deep impact of tactical voting in [[first past the post]] electoral systems, some argue that systems with three or more strong or persistent parties become in effect forms of [[disapproval voting]], where the expression of disapproval, to keep an opponent out of office overwhelms the expression of approval, to approve a desirable candidate. [[Ralph Nader]] refers to this as the "least worst" choice, and argues that the similarity of parties and the candidates grows stronger due to the need to avoid this disapproval.
== Notes ==
It's important to differentiate between ''coordinated'' strategy, and ''uncoordinated'' strategy, as well as informed strategy vs. uninformed strategy. For example, [[Approval voting]] and [[Score voting]] guarantee that at least half of the voters can force their preferred candidates to tie or win, and force their dispreferred candidates to tie or lose. However, this crucially hinges on these half of the voters of voters knowing a) that they all prefer those candidates, and b) that they all plan to use the strategy. Otherwise, those who attempt the strategy may either fail to support all of the candidates supported by the group of voters, resulting in the strategy not always working, or they may do it while not everyone else in the group does, which potentially weakens their own vote's ability to influence who wins among the candidates not maximally preferred by that half of the voters. So strategy comes in difficulty levels of execution.
==See also==
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