Talk:Asset voting: Difference between revisions
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I don't see how this could be true, since it's a single-mark ballot and suffers from vote-splitting/center-squeeze. I find it hard to believe that a candidate who received zero votes would win under Asset, even if they are the Condorcet winner and sole member of the Smith set. — [[User:Psephomancy|Psephomancy]] ([[User talk:Psephomancy|talk]]) 17:40, 15 December 2019 (UTC)
== Content from deleted Wikipedia article ==
<blockquote>'''Asset voting''' or '''candidate proxy''' is a [[voting system]] which provides [[proportional representation]] by allowing all [[candidate]]s to [[negotiate]] the outcome, using the votes cast for them as [[proxy vote|proxies]] in subsequent rounds. It is unconventional in the sense that not only voters, but also candidates, can directly affect the outcome.
Candidates may use, distribute, or redistribute votes they received in the election, negotiating with each other to put together a [[coalition]] of enough votes to win [[office]].
This was proposed in a [[pamphlet]] published by [[Lewis Carroll|Charles Dodgson (Lewis Carroll)]] in 1884.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=XJBaAAAAMAAJ&pgis=1|title=The Political Pamphlets and Letters of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson and Related Pieces|author=Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, Francine F. Abeles|year=2001|isbn=0930326148|publisher=Univ. Press of Virginia|location=Charlottesville}}</ref> Though famous for his [[Alice's Adventures in Wonderland|Alice]] stories, Dodgson was also a [[mathematician]] who pioneered [[voting theory]].<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=PN1dAAAACAAJ|title=A Mathematical Approach to Proportional Representation|author=Duncan Black, Iain McLean, Alistair McMillan, Burt L. Monroe, Charles Lutwidge Dodgson|isbn=0792396200|year=1996|publisher=Kluwer|location=Boston}}</ref> The mathematical economist, [[Duncan Black]], analysed his work and described the process: candidates receiving votes may treat them as "''if they were their own private property''" for purposes of creating [[proportional representation]].<ref>{{citation|url=http://rangevoting.org/BlackCarrollAER2.pdf|author=Duncan Black|title=Lewis Carroll and the Theory of Games|journal=The American Economic Review|volume=59|issue=2|date=May 1969|pages=206–210}}</ref> The term "''asset voting''" for this was coined by Warren D. Smith of the [[Center for Range Voting]] in 2004<ref>{{cite web|url=http://rangevoting.org/Asset.html|title=Asset voting – an interesting and very simple multiwinner voting system|author=Warren D. Smith|publisher=The Center for Range Voting|accessdate=29 May 2008}}</ref>. Mike Ossipoff (in 2000) and Forrest Simmons (in 2002) earlier referred to a similar idea as "''candidate proxy''".<ref>[http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/14269 Yahoo! Groups<!-- Bot generated title -->]</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://lists.electorama.com/htdig.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com/2002-December/008919.html|title=Candidate Proxy Methods|date=2 Dec 2002|publisher=Election Methods mailing list}}</ref>
This voting system may be used as a model to coordinate multiple heterogenous [[autonomous system]]s which have a [[mission]] with multiple [[goal|objective]]s. The autonomous systems are allowed to influence the [[weight]]s assigned to each objective. Results from a [[simulation]] demonstrated a level of overall mission success comparable to that obtained in an ideal centralised mechanism.<ref>{{cite conference|title=The coordination of multiple autonomous systems using information theoretic political science voting models|coauthors=A. Abel, S. Sukkarieh|publisher=IEEE|booktitle=2006 IEEE/SMC International Conference on System of Systems Engineering|date=24-26 April 2006|year=2006|url=http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/Xplore/login.jsp?url=/iel5/10995/34635/01652289.pdf?temp=x}}</ref>
== References ==
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