Talk:Asset voting: Difference between revisions
m
→Smith Set
m (→Smith Set) |
|||
Line 39:
:: Ok, so ignoring the fact that the negotiators' preferences may be completely different from the voters' preferences, if one of the negotiators is a Condorcet winner (among the negotiators), but has zero first-preference votes to barter with, how, realistically, are they going to be selected by the other negotiators as the winner? — [[User:Psephomancy|Psephomancy]] ([[User talk:Psephomancy|talk]]) 23:01, 15 December 2019 (UTC)
::: Suppose at every point in the negotiations, the negotiators are keeping track of the candidate (candidates equalling the number of seats, in the multiwinner case) with the most votes committed to them, and consider such a candidate "the one to beat", because this is the one who will win if the negotiators do nothing. Then, all it takes for Asset to elect a CW with no votes is for the other negotiators to keep looking for candidates who they a) prefer over "the one to beat" and who b) can get more votes to be committed to them. As an example:
26 AB
| |||