Talk:Asset voting: Difference between revisions

I don't see how this could be true, since it's a single-mark ballot and suffers from vote-splitting/center-squeeze. I find it hard to believe that [[User:Psephomancy/Three tribes|a candidate who received zero votes]] would win under Asset, even if they are the Condorcet winner and sole member of the Smith set. — [[User:Psephomancy|Psephomancy]] ([[User talk:Psephomancy|talk]]) 17:40, 15 December 2019 (UTC)

(I'm not sure how to do a user signature but this is BetterVotingAdvocacy in this paragraph): There are two Smith Sets to consider: the Smith Set of voter preferences (which is what Psephomancy addressed above) and the Smith Set of negotiator preferences (whoever the negotiators can give more votes to than any other winner or winner set.) To explain, if there are four candidates, and the voters' ranked preferences of them are:

:* 49 Liberal>Moderate>Conservative>Kim Kardashian

:* 10 Moderate

:* 41 Conservative>Moderate>Liberal>Kim Kardashian

: The Moderate is the Condorcet winner of voter preferences here. But suppose the voters submit a single-mark ballot, and now the votes are: 49 Liberal, 10 Moderate, 41 Conservative, 0 KK. Let's say the negotiators are corrupt and got paid off to elect KK; then the negotiator preferences now are:

:* 49 KK>L>M>C

:* 10 KK>M

:* 41 KK>C>M>L

: So the Condorcet winner, and sole Smith Set member, for negotiator preferences is KK. - [[User:BetterVotingAdvocacy]]