Talk:Condorcet winner criterion: Difference between revisions
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I don't know of a citation, but it's listed here, too: [[Condorcet_method#Related_terms]] — [[User:Psephomancy|Psephomancy]] ([[User talk:Psephomancy|talk]]) 00:21, 6 January 2020 (UTC)
== Generalization ==
[[User:Kristomun]], your edit
: A method passes the M-seat Condorcet criterion [...] When M=1, the generalization reduces to the ordinary Condorcet criterion as long as the method passes the majority criterion.
has a bit of an issue, since the majority criterion seems to speak of absolute majorities, not majorities of voters with any preference between the candidates. Thus, if 35% of voters prefer A>B, 25% prefer B>A, and 40% have no preference, with A and B being the only candidates, A is a plurality's 1st choice, and the 1st choice of a majority of voters with any preference between A and B, but not an absolute majority. Should we make an edit addressing this? [[User:BetterVotingAdvocacy|BetterVotingAdvocacy]] ([[User talk:BetterVotingAdvocacy|talk]]) 03:08, 19 March 2020 (UTC)
:: I can't seem to find a source saying indifference counts in favor of both, so I've changed the phrasing. [[User:Kristomun|Kristomun]] ([[User talk:Kristomun|talk]]) 14:45, 24 March 2020 (UTC)
== Social utility efficiency ==
Some of Colin Champion's work might be relevant to show that Condorcet can produce high efficiencies, but is still bounded away from maximum efficiency. E.g. "Better than Condorcet?" on EM, 2022-02-01, does this for a contrived mixture model. [[User:Kristomun|Kristomun]] ([[User talk:Kristomun|talk]]) 12:11, 16 April 2024 (UTC)
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