Anonymous user
Talk:Definite Majority Choice: Difference between revisions
→Strategic Vulnerability?
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Fourth, even if there are only 3 candidates: if the weakest defeat is B>A, then A and B are more closely aligned and are each other's compromise candidates over C. You describe a situation in which A's camp attempts to wrest the victory from their allies. This is sometimes known as the prisoner's dilemma betrayal strategy. If A's camp tries that, B's camp is likely to withhold approval from A. If the approval ratings are as narrow as you say, A will no longer be the highest approved candidate, and either B or C might win.
--[[User:Araucaria|Araucaria]] 10:44, 15 Sep 2005 (PDT)
Here are some other thoughts on [[User:Jrfisher]]'s example. I'm assuming he is imagining a scenario like
37: A>>C
33: B>>A
30: C>>B
that has statistically significant approval differences between the candidates, but no faction is willing to compromise approval of any other.
My first response to this is that in the case of a divided cyclic electorate, any strong Condorcet voting scheme, either [[Definite Majority Choice|DMC]] or [[Schulze method|Schulze(wv)]], provides an incentive for a fourth compromise candidate to run, if only as a write-in candidate. In other words, there is the opportunity for candidate D, either as
37: A>>D>C
33: B>>D>A
30: C>>D>B
or by gaining approval of 1, 2 or 3 of the factions. So this example is somewhat artificial.
Secondly, A might have an incentive to inflate C's approval, giving C an incentive to promote B's, but ther e is no incentive for B to similarly promote A's approval. Since A's faction can't be sure how the C group and the B group will respond, they can't use the strategy as a standard maneuver.
--[[User:Araucaria|Araucaria]] 09:53, 21 Sep 2005 (PDT)
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