electowiki

Talk:Definite Majority Choice: Difference between revisions

Page Discussion

Talk:Definite Majority Choice (view source)

Revision as of 20:19, 21 September 2005

769 bytes added ,  18 years ago
→‎Strategic Vulnerability?: Second rebuttal (amended)
VisualWikitext
imported>Araucaria
(→‎Strategic Vulnerability?: Second rebuttal (amended))
Line 64:
--[[User:Araucaria|Araucaria]] 10:44, 15 Sep 2005 (PDT)
 
[[User:Araucaria|Araucaria]] responds again:
Here are some other thoughts on [[User:Jrfisher]]'s example. I'm assuming he is imagining a scenario like▼
 
▲Here are some other thoughts on [[User:Jrfisher|Jrfisher]]'s example. I'm assuming he is imagining a scenario likesimilar to
37: A>>C
33: B>>A
Line 70 ⟶ 72:
that has statistically significant approval differences between the candidates, but no faction is willing to compromise approval of any other.
 
My first response to this is that inIn the case of a divided cyclic electorate, any strong Condorcet voting scheme,---for example either [[Definite Majority Choice|DMC]] or [[Schulze method|Schulze(wv)]], ---provides an incentive for a fourth compromise candidate to run, if only as a write-in candidate. In other words, there is the opportunity for candidate D, either as
37: A>>D>C
33: B>>D>A
30: C>>D>B
or
or by gaining approval of 1, 2 or 3 of the factions. So this example is somewhat artificial.
37: A>D>>C
33: B>D>>C
30: C>D>>B
So this example is somewhat artificial. More worrisome and possibly more common is whether a faction would ''deliberately'' induce a cycle in order to take advantage of a Condorcet completion scheme's elimination of either the weakest defeat in the cycle or the weakest candidate. In this case, [[DMC]] has a major ''advantage'' over [[Schulze method|Schulze(wv)]], because the strategic unpredictability of the approval cutoff makes such maneuvering riskier.
 
But even if such a situation arises, what could happen? A might have an incentive to inflate C's approval. B becomes lowest approved and is eliminated. If C's faction wants to prevent an A victory, they can elevate B's approval and A is eliminated, electing C. B's faction might object to both A and C's insincerity, but by avoiding insincere promotion of A, they effectively create a poison pill against A's tactic.
 
So the question in any campaign tactician's mind has to be, can I profit through a Mexican standoff? It is very risky. The best bet in that case is to avoid shooting and attempt to forge an ally.
Secondly, A might have an incentive to inflate C's approval, giving C an incentive to promote B's, but ther e is no incentive for B to similarly promote A's approval. Since A's faction can't be sure how the C group and the B group will respond, they can't use the strategy as a standard maneuver.
--[[User:Araucaria|Araucaria]] 0913:5319, 21 Sep 2005 (PDT)
Anonymous user
Retrieved from "https://electowiki.org/wiki/Special:MobileDiff/3229"