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Talk:Definite Majority Choice: Difference between revisions
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== Majority? ==
Please let us avoid the term "majority" when there need not be any majority involved! Look at this:
<pre>
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:Then choose the winner by [[Random Ballot]].
== Strategic Vulnerability? ==
If a faction sees a Condorcet paradox looming, can it gain an advantage by insincerely approving of the contender that it expects to defeat pair-wise?
Your polling data: Approval runs narrowly A>B>C, but pairings run A>C>B>A, so 'B' stands to win under DMC. You're the tactician for faction 'A'. Can your supporters insincerely increase approval of 'C' in order to eliminate 'B'?
If so, then it doesn't even matter if you over-do it: As long as you expect to win head to head, you may hand out approval points with impunity and perhaps steal a victory. Of course, once this leaks out, 'C' will boost 'B', and 'B' will boost you... and the faction controlling the most first place votes will bury its nemesis and prevail.
So, in practice, will DMC degenerate into basic Condorcet with whatever limitations that has? [[User:Jrfisher|Jrfisher]] 19:12, 29 Aug 2005 (PDT)
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