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Talk:Definite Majority Choice: Difference between revisions
→Strategic Vulnerability?
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So, in practice, will DMC degenerate into basic Condorcet with whatever limitations that has? [[User:Jrfisher|Jrfisher]] 19:12, 29 Aug 2005 (PDT)
Note: There's little risk in extending approval to inferiors even when one does NOT know if a paradox looming. Therefore, approval extension will probably become automatic voter behavior, rendering DMC's approval results misleading, and that will lead to voter confusion and dissatisfaction as apparently highly popular candidates are regularly declared to be losers. Perhaps this effect on all elections, rather than the effect during paradoxes, is what will render DMC completely unworkable. [[User:Jrfisher|Jrfisher]] 10:46, 14 Sep 2005 (PDT)
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