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Talk:Definite Majority Choice: Difference between revisions
→Strategic Vulnerability?: Rebuttal
imported>Jrfisher |
imported>Araucaria (→Strategic Vulnerability?: Rebuttal) |
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Note: There's little risk in extending approval to inferiors even when one does NOT know if a paradox looming. Therefore, approval extension will probably become automatic voter behavior, rendering DMC's approval results misleading, and that will lead to voter confusion and dissatisfaction as apparently highly popular candidates are regularly declared to be losers. Perhaps this effect on all elections, rather than the effect during paradoxes, is what will render DMC completely unworkable. [[User:Jrfisher|Jrfisher]] 10:46, 14 Sep 2005 (PDT)
[[User:Araucaria|Araucaria]] responds:
First of all, your example is not complete. There are 15 possible ballots that could be submitted in a 3 candidate race.
# A
# A>B
# A>>B
# A>C
# A>>C
# B
# B>C
# B>>C
# B>A
# B>>A
# C
# C>A
# C>>A
# C>B
# C>>B
A's approval comes from (1-5,9,12); B's approval comes from (2,6-10,14); C's approval comes from (4,7,11-15). A>C votes come from (1-5,9,10); etc. If you first specify some range of conditions, such as all approval ratings > 50%, or all < 50%, then it is possible to generate ballot combinations from the space of possible solutions. Could you give an example of a set of ballots that demonstrate your case?
Secondly, polling is imprecise, usually accurate only to within 3%. So "narrow" difference of approval makes strategizing risky, if there is a possibility of the strategy backfiring.
Third, consider how a 3 candidate cycle might arise. With lower barriers to entry, the field is likely to be more crowded. So the 3 candidate cycle might not be known in advance.
Fourth, even if there are only 3 candidates: if the weakest defeat is B>A, then A and B are more closely aligned and are each other's compromise candidates over C. You describe a situation in which A's camp attempts to wrest the victory from their allies. This is sometimes known as the prisoner's dilemma betrayal strategy. If A's camp tries that, B's camp is likely to withhold approval from A. If the approval ratings are as narrow as you say, A will no longer be the highest approved candidate, and either B or C might win.
--[[User:Araucaria|Araucaria]] 10:44, 15 Sep 2005 (PDT)
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