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Talk:Definite Majority Choice: Difference between revisions
→Strategic Vulnerability?: Second rebuttal (amended)
imported>Araucaria (→Strategic Vulnerability?: Second rebuttal (amended)) |
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--[[User:Araucaria|Araucaria]] 10:44, 15 Sep 2005 (PDT)
[[User:Araucaria|Araucaria]] responds again:
Here are some other thoughts on [[User:Jrfisher]]'s example. I'm assuming he is imagining a scenario like▼
▲Here are some other thoughts on [[User:Jrfisher|Jrfisher]]'s example. I'm assuming he is imagining a scenario
37: A>>C
33: B>>A
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that has statistically significant approval differences between the candidates, but no faction is willing to compromise approval of any other.
37: A>>D>C
33: B>>D>A
30: C>>D>B
or
37: A>D>>C
33: B>D>>C
30: C>D>>B
So this example is somewhat artificial. More worrisome and possibly more common is whether a faction would ''deliberately'' induce a cycle in order to take advantage of a Condorcet completion scheme's elimination of either the weakest defeat in the cycle or the weakest candidate. In this case, [[DMC]] has a major ''advantage'' over [[Schulze method|Schulze(wv)]], because the strategic unpredictability of the approval cutoff makes such maneuvering riskier.
But even if such a situation arises, what could happen? A might have an incentive to inflate C's approval. B becomes lowest approved and is eliminated. If C's faction wants to prevent an A victory, they can elevate B's approval and A is eliminated, electing C. B's faction might object to both A and C's insincerity, but by avoiding insincere promotion of A, they effectively create a poison pill against A's tactic.
So the question in any campaign tactician's mind has to be, can I profit through a Mexican standoff? It is very risky. The best bet in that case is to avoid shooting and attempt to forge an ally.
--[[User:Araucaria|Araucaria]]
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