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Talk:Definite Majority Choice: Difference between revisions
→Strategic Vulnerability?
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33: B>D>>C
30: C>D>>B
So this example is somewhat artificial. More worrisome and possibly more common is whether a faction would ''deliberately'' induce a cycle in order to take advantage of a Condorcet completion scheme's elimination of either the weakest defeat in the cycle or the weakest candidate. In this case, [[Definite Majority Choice|DMC]] has a major ''advantage'' over [[Schulze method|Schulze(wv)]], because the strategic unpredictability of the approval cutoff makes such maneuvering riskier.
But even if such a situation arises, what could happen? A might have an incentive to inflate C's approval. B becomes lowest approved and is eliminated. If C's faction wants to prevent an A victory, they can elevate B's approval and A is eliminated, electing C. B's faction might object to both A and C's insincerity, but by avoiding insincere promotion of A, they effectively create a poison pill against A's tactic.
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