Talk:IRV Prime: Difference between revisions
→Arrow/IIA
No edit summary |
|||
Line 43:
::In that case, if C is the winner and IRV Prime is majority rule in the two-candidate case, eliminating A (an irrelevant candidate) will make B win, which is a violation of IIA. [[User:Kristomun|Kristomun]] ([[User talk:Kristomun|talk]]) 09:17, 4 August 2021 (UTC)
You're correct, thanks for that example. It does not fulfill IIA: (sorry I'm still learning this stuff)
if one candidate (X) would win an election, and if a new candidate (Y) were added to the ballot, then either X or Y would win the election.
But if you look at the ballots, this actually makes sense from a social representation perspective:
{{ballots|
35: B>C
30: B>C
25: C>B}}
B best represents the population.
However, when A enters the race, B no longer has the votes to win, so their voters must now compromise. By definition it's still a "spoiler candidate", but it's the opposite effect: in plurality, a spoiler results in a candidate that could win to lose (by vote splitting); in IRV-Prime, it causes votes for a candidate that was going to lose to shift to those voters' next favorite.
--[[User:Marcosb|Marcosb]] ([[User talk:Marcosb|talk]]) 16:18, 4 August 2021 (UTC)
==== References ====
| |||