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Talk:Later-no-harm criterion: Difference between revisions
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According to the favorite betrayal write-up, Condorcet methods (except Kevin's) violate it. Given what I know and like about Condorcet methods, this suggests that there's something wrong with either that criterion or its application. [[User:Jrfisher|Jrfisher]] 09:28, 18 Aug 2005 (PDT)
So "given what [you] know and like about Condorcet methods," they can't fail a criterion unless something is wrong with that criterion? What about the other criteria that Condorcet is incompatible with?
If you disallow ties in the ranking, it is quite clear that Condorcet methods fail FBC. Assume that these votes are sincere:
40 A>B>C<br>
35 B>C>A<br>
25 C>A>B
Assuming this is a Condorcet method, then regardless of which candidate is elected above, some voters have incentive to insincerely rank a candidate strictly above their favorite candidate.
The danger of this is that if voters realize that ''sometimes'' they need to rank a viable compromise above their favorite, they may be cautious and do this ''all'' the time.
My Condorcet method ([[ICA]]) satisfies FBC because it is tweaked to do so. It doesn't strictly satisfy the Condorcet criterion. Here is an example:
40 A>B|C<br>
35 A=B|C<br>
25 B|A=C
The Condorcet winner is A. But the [[ICA]] winner is B. [[User:KVenzke|Kevin Venzke]] 11:41, 18 Aug 2005 (PDT)
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