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Talk:Plurality criterion: Difference between revisions
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→How does the Plurality set (and a subset of that) relate to anti-order reversal criteria?
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imported>R.H. |
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Look at rankings (equal rankings allowed) and for each option simulate that it got the luckiest Approval voting treatment aside from order reversal. That means: For those ballots that give option X any other ranking than last place move the approval cutoff just behind X. For those ballots that have X in last place let approval be as stingy as possible so only approve their first place preferences.
<s>Those options that would win under these conditions are the Plurality set (or better call it the set of possible Approval Winners). Are there methods that satisfy plurality but not independence of options outside this set?</s>
*Update: The set of Possible Approval Winners is more discriminating than and therefore not equal to the Plurality set. See:[http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2007-March/019770.html Electorama posting] by Chris Benham quoting an example by Kevin Venzke.
More discriminating:
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Would that have problems with Mono-Raise or Reversal Symmetry like so many other elimination methods and if it does, could applying the elimination process in the opposite direction as well fix it (at least the symmetry bit I guess)? --[[User:R.H.|R.H.]] 13:34, 14 September 2006 (PDT)
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