Talk:Sequentially Spent Score: Difference between revisions
m
no edit summary
No edit summary |
mNo edit summary |
||
Line 15:
:: [[User:Dr. Edmonds]] I forgot to state the criteria I was talking about here - Reversal symmetry. Consistency on the other hand (where if you partition the electorate into multiple groups that all elect the same set of winners, the electorate overall should also elect that same set of winners) is (in my view) definitely a desirable criteria for both single and multi-winner elections. [[User:ParkerFriedland|ParkerFriedland]] ([[User talk:ParkerFriedland|talk]]) 01:23, 11 February 2020 (UTC)
:: [[User:Dr. Edmonds]] Why I don't think reversal symmetry is desirable in multi-winner proportional methods: if 25% of voters approve D, 25% approve R, 25% approve I and D, and 25% approve I and R, then D and R should win (since all candidates are approved by 50% of voters so the total utility will be the same but if you elect D and R all voters will have approved of at-least one candidate). If you reverse all the ballots then D and R should still win because the votes are exactly the same. Reversal symmetry would instead require all the possible results to be tied with one another because if any one result won, reversing the results would force one of the other two to be the resulting outcome (or for the resulting outcome to be the other two possible results tied with each other) which is impossible because both the reversed and unreserved cases of these ballots are identical. Thus reversal symmetry is (in my view) clearly not desirable in multi-winner methods when proportionality is desired. [[User:ParkerFriedland|ParkerFriedland]] ([[User talk:ParkerFriedland|talk]]) 03:10, 11 February 2020 (UTC)
4. As you said yourself, vote unitary isn't a criteria but a class of voting methods. It's not a criteria so we shouldn't treat it as one.
| |||