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As of 2005, my favorite Condorcet completion method was [[Definite Majority Choice]]. In the interest of expediency, I would favor some kind of transition as follows:
* FavoriteFirst Choice plus [[Approval voting|Approval]]: Single FavoriteFirst Choice vote, plus [[Approval voting|Approval]] of any number of other candidates. FavoriteThe First Choice is also approved. If no Favoritecandidate wins >50% +of the First Choice 1votes, elect candidate with highest approval.
* FavoriteFirst Choice plus [[Range voting]]. Single FavoriteFirst Choice as above, plus a score of 0 to 99 can be given to any number of other candidates. Same fallback as above, except total rangeratings score is used instead of approval.
Once a [[Ratings ballot]] begins to beis used, the scores could be tabulated (inferring candidate rankings from their ratings) and reported with 5 different methods for comparison: Top FavoriteFirst Choice, [[Range voting]], [[Schulze]], [[Definite Majority Choice]], or [[Cardinal pairwise]] using [[River]]. To do this, it would be necessary to infer candidate rankings from the sorted ratings.
With familiarity, it would eventually be possible to transition to a more robust voting system. In the case of no candidate winning a majority of the FavoriteFirst Choice votes, we could select from one of the other four robust methods at random to introduce unpredictability (thus avoiding [[Arrow's impossibility theorem|Arrow's paradox]]). Since all four methods have similar sincere voting strategies but different strategies in the case of cycles, it would give an incentive to vote by sincere preference instead of trying to game the system.
I would prefer to avoid primary elections. However, they may continue to be required during a transition period. If that is the case, I would recommend using
* FavoriteFirst Choice plus Approval. As above. Narrow field to at least 2 candidates, comprising the most-favoredcandidate with highest First Choice totals (single vote winner), most-approved, and second-highest approved, plus any other candidates with higher approval than the Single-Vote winner. The main advantage of this is simplicity, plus it would be a marked improvement of the Top-Two Louisiana-style primary using Single Vote --- voters would be assured that a good selection of alternative candidates would face the Single-vote winner in the general election.
* FavoriteFirst Choice plus [[Range voting]]. As above. Narrow field to at least 2 candidates, who would include the most-favoredSingle Vote winner, most-approvedApproval winner, second-highest approved, plus any other candidate with a pairwise [[Beatpath|beatpath]] to the most-approvedApproval winner. The improvement here over FavoriteFirst Choice plus Approval would be that the entire [[Smith set]] (plus first- and second-place approval winnerwinners) would be included in the slate of candidates going to the general election.
You can contact me at ''araucaria dot araucana at gmail dot com''.
== Election Reform Priorities ==
My highly opinionated views on what can be done to improve the US form of government:
=== Trust in the process ===
Before anything else, we need to trust the mechanics of voting:
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