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Araucaria

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User:Araucaria (view source)

Revision as of 22:26, 21 January 2010

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Score Voting is now my favorite
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imported>Araucaria
(Simplify primary vote proposal: augmented Top Two primary)
imported>Araucaria
(Score Voting is now my favorite)
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Instead of our current ([[First Past the Post electoral system|Single vote]]) system, I would prefer a voting method that does not force one to vote for a compromise based on assumptions of what other voters would do.
 
[[Range voting]] could be implemented immediately on current optical scan ballots, and would, in most cases, select the candidate closest to the centroid of political opinion. With [[Range voting|range]] (AKA ''score voting''), there is no need for a primary. However, if the slate of candidates is not well-known, it may necessary to hold a runoff if the candidate with highest total score has less than 50% of the maximum possible score. In that case, I would encourage a runoff with the following criteria:
In the interest of simplicity and expediency, I favor an incremental transition as follows:
* Include all candidates whose score sum is at least half that of the maximum score sum, including at least the top three scoring candidates.
* First Choice plus [[Approval voting|Approval]]: Single First Choice vote, plus [[Approval voting|Approval]] of any number of other candidates. The First Choice is also approved. If no candidate wins >50% of the First Choice votes, elect candidate with highest approval.
* Also include the top three candidates with highest ''average'' score, provided they meet some quorum rule (e.g., score sum greater than or equal to 5% of the maximum).
* First Choice plus [[Range voting]]. Single First Choice as above, plus a score of 0 to 99 can be given to any number of other candidates. First Choice is also assumed to have highest score (i.e., 99). In the event that no candidate has a majority (>50%) of First Place votes, use the same Approval fallback as above, except cumulative ratings score is used instead of total approval votes.
* The number of runoff candidates should be at least three, not two. Why? Since Range does not penalize a voter for rating more than one candidate, the extra choice will increase the level of debate. With the current two-party duopoly, there is an implicit agreement to avoid discussing complicated issues.
 
Why do I favor [[Range voting]] over [[Approval voting|Approval]]? It allows the voter toexpress showmore anuance lesserin preferencetheir forselection. some candidates,While ifit onlymay tobe encouragebetter themstrategically to(from keepan contributingindividual tovoter's publicpoint discourse.of view) Andto perhapsgive moremaximum importantly,score itto canall beacceptable usedcandidates, toratings inferallow [[Preferentialthe voting|candidatevoter rankings]]to byexpress sortingpartial theapproval candidate'sfor ratingsother inviewpoints, orderif from highestonly to lowest.encourage them Candidatesto withkeep equalcontributing ratingsto wouldpublic be given equal rankdiscourse.
 
Once a [[Ratings ballot]] is used, the scores could be tabulated and reported with 5 different methods for comparison: Top First Choice ([[First Past the Post electoral system|Single vote]]); [[Range voting]]; plus 3 robust [[Condorcet method|Condorcet completion methods]]: [[Schulze]]; [[Definite Majority Choice]]; and [[Cardinal pairwise]] using [[River]].
 
As voters recognize the difference between FC+RV and more sophisticated methods, support would increase for the transition to a more robust voting system.
 
In the case of no candidate winning a majority of the First Choice votes, we could select from one of the other four robust methods at random to discourage strategic voting. Since all four methods have similar sincere voting strategies but different strategies in the case of cycles, it would give the voter a strong incentive to vote by sincere preference instead of trying to game the system, thus avoiding [[Arrow's impossibility theorem|Arrow's paradox]].
 
I would prefer to avoid primary elections. However, they may continue to be required during a transition period. If that is the case, I would recommend using
* First Choice plus Approval. As above. Pitch the method as an augmented [[Top Two Primary]]: Narrow field to at least 2 candidates, comprising the two candidate with highest First Choice totals (single vote winner plus single-vote runner-up), plus any other candidates with equal or higher approval than the top two single-vote candidates. This would automatically include at least the top two Approved candidates. The main advantage of this is simplicity, plus it would be a marked improvement of the Top-Two Louisiana-style primary using Single Vote --- voters would be assured that a good selection of alternative candidates would face the Single-vote winner in the general election, instead of dividing the opposition.
* First Choice plus [[Range voting]]. As above. Narrow field to at least 2 candidates, who would include the Single Vote winner and runner-up, plus any other candidate with a pairwise [[Beatpath|beatpath]] to the cumulative ratings winner, plus any candidate with higher cumulative rating than the Single Vote winner and single-vote runner-up. The improvement here over First Choice plus Approval would be that the entire [[Smith set]] (plus first- and second-place range voting winners) would be included in the slate of candidates going to the general election.
 
For many years I favored [[Condorcet method|Condorcet completion methods]] such as [[Schulze]] or [[River]], especially with [[Cardinal pairwise]] weighting to take advantage of a ratings ballot. However, I have come to realize that
* All ranked ballot methods are subject to [[Arrow's impossibility theorem]], but Score Voting is not.
* Score Voting is better able to choose the centroid winner in single-winner elections than any Condorcet method.
* Score Voting is simple to implement and would give better results quickly.
 
You can contact me at ''araucaria dot araucana at gmail dot com''.
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==== The House of Representatives is not representative ====
The US House of Representatives has been frozen at 435 members for nearly 100 years. That's one member for every 640,000 people. The Founders originally thought there would be one member for every [http://www.thirty-thousand.org 30 to 50 thousand] people. The number of representatives should be [http://www.prb.org/Content/NavigationMenu/PT_articles/Growth_in_U_S__Population_Calls_for_Larger_House_of_Representatives.htm increased to at least 600]. This would also decrease the over-representation of small states and under-representation of large states in the Electoral College.
 
I favor an increase to 600 districts with 5 members per district.
==== Proportional Representation ====
Local representation is best implemented using [[Proportional_representation|Proportional]] or [http://www.fairvote.org/pr/ Full Representation], with at least 5 members per district. The[[Single_transferable_vote]] best(STV) wayis the method used in most of the world to doimplement thisPR, but it is withcomplicated and is difficult to scale. Instead, I favor [[Single_transferable_vote]http://rangevoting.org/Asset.html Asset Voting]. Each voter would have 10 votes, which they could distribute among any number of candidates (STVup to 10, of course). After the first round of voting, the candidates would treat their votes as assets and could trade votes to accumulate a Hare quota and win a seat.
=== A better single-winner [[Voting system]] ===
Proportional Representation (PR) proponents tend to think that if STV is good for multi-winner elections, it will be good for single-winner elections also, in the form known as [[Instant-runoff_voting|Instant Runoff Voting (IRV)]]. But [[Instant-runoff_voting#Flaws_of_IRV|it isn't]]. That's because STV is very good at ensuring representation of a wide variety of different viewpoints but isn't so good at aggregating many different viewpoints into a single compromise.
 
The best [[voting system]] for single-winner elections (e.g. senator, governor, president) is [[CondorcetRange methodvoting|CondorcetScore Voting]], also known as InstantCardinal Round RobinRatings or PairwiseRange Voting. It uses a ranked ballot, just like IRV, but is counted differently.
* Unlike IRV, it doesn't require recounting ballots after each elimination.
* Unlike IRV, all ranked preferences are accounted for, not just those for the eliminated candidates.
 
=== See also ===
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* See third Letter to the Editor on [http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2008098337_friletters8.html this page]. It is a proposal to use First Choice plus Approval as an alternative to the Top 2 primary.
* [http://bolson.org/voting/irv/ Why IRV gets worse results].
* http://scorevoting.net
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