User:Cymru/Independence of equivalent candidates criterion: Difference between revisions

The '''Independence of Equivalent Candidates criterion''' was devised in 2005 by Thomas Smith. It was inspired by the inadequate definition of the [[Strategic nomination|independence of clones]] criterion which does not properly address rated voting systems and falsely presumes that correlated candidates are necessarily equivalent to each other. This criterion is a theoretical, rather than a practical criterion, and is used to describe the susceptibility of voting methods to the influence of candidates that are perceived by all voters as equivalent.

Equivalent candidates are a group of candidates that are supportively ranked/rated in adjacent positions, where equal ranking is not allowed, or equally ranked or /rated, where equality is allowed, on ''every'' cast ballot. Thus, an approved and a disapproved candidate can never be "clones" as theyone areis notsupportively rated equallyand the other is not.