Utilitarian Voting: Difference between revisions

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==Discussion==
This voting system is analso called [[approval methodvoting]]. It is said to satisfy Bentham's principle by electing the candidate that makes the greatest number of voters happy. A criticism of this voting system is that it only tries to make the greatest number of voters happy. It does not take into account the extent of happiness. [http://rangevoting.org/vsr.html Social utility efficiency] calculations show that the most utilitarian of the common voting methods, if we consider the degree of happiness rather than an arbitrary binary "happy/unhappy" metric, is [http://RangeVoting.org/ Range Voting]. Some sample social utility efficiency calculations expressed as voter satisfaction ratios (the percentage of the total ideal utility achieved - not the percent of satisfied voters):
 
Utility measurements: Group A: 5 candidates, 20 voters, random utilities; Each entry averages the results from 4,000,000 simulated elections. Group B: 5 candidates, 50 voters, utilities based on 2 issues, each entry averages the results from 2,222,222 simulated elections.
 
'''Voting system - VSR A - VSR B'''
 
Magically elect optimum winner 100.00% 100.00%
Range (honest voters) 96.71% 94.66%
Borda (honest voters) 91.31% 89.97%
Approval (honest voters) 86.30% 83.53%
Condorcet-LR (honest voters) 85.19% 85.43%
Range & Approval (strategic voters) 78.99% 77.01%
IRV (honest voters) 78.49% 76.32%
Plurality (honest voters) 67.63% 62.29%
Borda (strategic exaggerating voters) 53.26% 51.78%
Condorcet-LR (strategic voters) 42.56% 41.31%
IRV (strategic exaggerating voters) 39.07% 39.21%
Plurality (strategic voters) 39.07% 39.21%
Elect random winner 0.00% 0.00%
 
[[Category:Single-winner voting systems]]
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