Utility: Difference between revisions

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A majority prefer A over B, but are willing to support either of the two, whereas a minority both prefer and only support B. Therefore, ordinal utility says A is best, while rated utility says B is best.
 
== Two-candidate case ==
In the two-candidate case, the two approaches differ; cardinal/rated utility says that the candidate who makes voters net-happier should win (if everyone measured their happiness on a scale), whereas ranked/ordinal utility requires [[Majority rule|majority rule]], which can be thought of as at least satisfying the [[Majority criterion|majority criterion]].
 
[[Self-referential Smith-efficient Condorcet method|Self-referential Smith-efficient Condorcet methods]] that always elect the utilitarian (rated utility) winner in the two-candidate case will be [[Approval voting]] or [[Score voting]]. For majority rule, the equivalent is [[Smith-efficient]] [[Condorcet methods]].
 
Note that in the two-candidate case, voters using rated utilities can exaggerate the difference in utility between the candidates to derive majority rule, wholewhile voters using ranked utilities can (in the limit) approximate ratesrated utility by using a probability proportional to their personal difference in utility between the two candidates to decide whether to vote for their preferred candidate of the two, or not vote. Example:
 
100,001: A:1 B:0.8
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The points are roughly A 100,000, B 180,000, so there is a rated utility margin of 80,000 points in favor of B.
 
If, for cardinal utility, the A>B voters give B a 0, they can make A have slightly more points, i.e. majority rule. And if, in majority rule, the A>B voters use a 20% probability of voting A>B and 80% for voting A=B (i.e. a 20% probability of picking A and a 80% probability of not voting for either candidate), then in the limit, A will have ~20,000 votes and B ~100,000, which is an 80,000 vote margin in favor of B, thus effectively simulating the rated utility margin. <br />Another consideration is whether there should be a "satisfaction threshold" at which point increasing someone's utility matters less. For example, between a candidate who gives 100% utility to 60% of the voters and a candidate who gives 51% utility to all voters, some would consider the latter candidate better, despite them giving less cardinal utility., because all voters get significant utility from them, while 49% of voters get nothing from the first candidate. See <ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/acw8fs/mock_ballot_who_do_you_think_should_win_in_this/|title=r/EndFPTP - Mock ballot: who do you think should win in this election, and why?|website=reddit|language=en-US|access-date=2020-05-11}}<nowiki/ref> for an example.
 
== Ballot types ==
There are two ways to derive ranked ballots using ordinal utility. The first is for a voter to ask themselves "who are the candidates I would want to win if I could choose the winner myself?" This is equivalent to asking who you would honestly vote for in [[FPTP]], and it shows who your 1st choice(s) are. If you then remove them from consideration and repeat the question, you find your 2nd choices, etc. The second way is for a voter to ask themselves, for every possible [[head-to-head matchup]], who they'd prefer. The [[Copeland]] ranking shows the voter's ranking of the candidates. This is arguably one way to justify [[Smith-efficient]] [[Condorcet methods]]: if, for an individual voter, the best candidate(s) are the ones from the smallest group that win all head-to-head matchups against all other candidates based only on that voter's judgment, then why not for society? Similar reasoning shows why [[Score voting]] can be justified using rated utilities in head-to-head matchups to quantify harm or benefit done to the voter.
 
== Notes ==
One notable contrast between ordinal and cardinal utility is that with ordinal, one voter can shift their preference to make a good majority-preferred candidate become a bad minority-preferred candidate, whereas with cardinal utility, there is a degree of damage i.e. it is not too bad a thing to elect a candidate with slightly less utility than the utilitarian winner.
 
=== Additive nature ===
Many forms of utility are mostly additive i.e. it's not the voters' individual preferences that are of utmost importance, but rather the values produced by adding them up. For example, a candidate given 5 points when voters had rated ballots on a scale of 0 to 5 could've been given 1 point by 5 voters or 5 points by 1 voter.
 
Likewise, with [[pairwise preference]]<nowiki/>s, if candidate A has 5 votes against B's 4 in the A vs B matchup, this could be equivalent to 5 voters ranking A 1st and B 2nd, or 5 voters ranking A 2nd-to-last and B last.
 
== Utility vs utility ==