Vote unitarity: Difference between revisions

Since [[Single Transferable Vote]] allocates voters it violates vote unitarity by over removing influence in some cases. [[Reweighted Range Voting]] on the other hand only reduces influence fractionally so a voter who got a candidate they gave max score in the first round they ballot weight is reduced to 1/2. This violates the principle of one person one vote since this person would essentially be allowed to vote with half weight in later rounds (note that if a Bloc Score election is treated as a sequential method, then every time a candidate is elected, a voter who got one of their max-scored candidates is actually allowed to vote with full weight in later rounds, Thiele methods such as RRV are more proportional than Bloc elections because they at least reduce ballot weight to some degree). Proponents of [[Single Transferable Vote]] would use this argument for its superior fairness over [[Reweighted Range Voting]]. [[Keith Edmonds]] wanted to design a score reweighting system which had neither of these flaws. As such it would preserve the amount of score used through sequential rounds. He was also unhappy with [[Allocated Score]] since somebody who only gave a score of 1 to the winner could lose all future influence. [[Sequentially Spent Score]] is the sequential [[Multi-Member System | Multi-Winner]] [[Cardinal voting systems | Cardinal voting system]] built on [[Score voting]] ballots to follow this principle.