Vote unitarity: Difference between revisions
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Dr. Edmonds (talk | contribs) (Removing {{citation needed}} since doubt about if Sequentially Spent Score passes vote unitarity and the Hare Quata Criterion should be addressed there.) |
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On an even further extreme, [[Bloc voting]] when treated as a sequential method often violates Vote Unitarity even more than [[Reweighted Range Voting]] since a voter can fully influence the election of multiple candidates independently without any reweighing. [[Cumulative voting | Cumulative Voting]] attempts to mitigate this by giving voters the same amount of vote beforehand with the understanding that it is up to them to chose how to distribute their vote's weight on their ballot. This also has the added effect which makes outcomes of [[Cumulative voting | Cumulative Voting]] have higher [[Proportional representation]] than standard Bloc Systems. Thiele methods such as [[Reweighted Range Voting]] violate Vote Unitarity less than Bloc elections because they at least reduce ballot weight to some degree. In addition they do this reweigting in such a way to satisfy the Hare Quota Criterion.
== Example ==
In a 5-winner election, if there is a candidate that 90% of voters maximally support, and that the other 10% of voters don't support, supposing this candidate is the first one elected, with Thiele reweighting, the 90% of voters supporting that candidate will have their ballot weight reduced from 100% to 50%, whereas with Vote unitary-based reweighting, they'd have their ballot weight reduced to 77%. Note that Thiele's reweighting stays the same no matter how seats are to be filled, whereas Vote unitarity takes this into account. Vote unitarity takes into account the popularity of a candidate when deciding how much ballot weight should be spent.
==Relation to Similar Concepts==
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