Woodall's method: Difference between revisions

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Definition of "beats":
{{definition|X beats Y if more ballots rank X over Y than rank Y over X.}}
{{definition|X beats Y if more ballots rank X over Y than rank Y over X.}}An alternative (but equivalent) definition of Woodall's used in James Green-Armytage's Condorcet-IRV paper<ref>http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE29/I29P1.PDF</ref>:<blockquote>Score candidates according to their elimination scores, and choose the Smith set candidate with best score. That is, define each candidate’s elimination score as the round in which he is eliminated by AV [IRV].</blockquote>
 
=== A few properties of Woodall ===
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Meeting Smith always implies meeting MMC, and Condorcet Loser as well.
 
Woodall doesn't meet [[FBC]]. FBC is necessary only under current conditions (dishonest, disinformational media, and an electorate who believe those media). Woodall isn't proposed for current conditions. Likewise for the similar methods proposed later at this page.
 
Consistency criteria: Woodall, like all Condorcet methods, fails Consistency, Participation, Mono-Add-Top, and Mono-Add-Unique-Top. Woodall fails Mono-Raise, but passes Mono-Add-Plump and Mono-Append.
 
Woodall's importance comes from its unmatched freedom from strategy-need, made possible by MMC, freedom from chicken dilemma, and CC. Advantages such as that come at a price. The abovementionedabove-mentioned combination of properties appears to be incompatible with FBC and with Mono-Raise, Participation, Mono-Add-Top and Mono-Add-Unique top. Choice of a voting system always involves choice among properties.
 
The consistency criteria don't have strategic importance.
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It should be pointed out that, of course, if there is a CW, then
Woodall and Benham, by their above-stated definitions, will elect that
CW without doing any IRV.
 
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For current conditions (disinformational media and an electorate who
believe those media), [[FBC]] is necessary.
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== Schwartz Woodall ==
{{Merge to|Schwartz Woodall|date=August 2019}}
 
Schwartz Woodall is a variation of Woodall, and an improvement for
small electorates, such as organizations, meetings or families.
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3. The Schwartz set is the set of candidates who are in innermost unbeaten sets.}}
 
[[Category:Smith-efficient Condorcet methods]]
[[Category:Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods]]