3-2-1 voting: Difference between revisions
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This system satisfies the [[Majority criterion]]; the [[Condorcet Loser criterion]]; [[monotonicity]]; and [[local independence of irrelevant alternatives]]. |
This system satisfies the [[Majority criterion]]; the [[Condorcet Loser criterion]]; [[monotonicity]]; and [[local independence of irrelevant alternatives]]. |
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It satisfies the [[mutual majority criterion]] as long as any member of the mutual majority set of candidates is among the 3 semifinalists. In practice, this is almost guaranteed to be the case. |
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Steps 1 and 3 satisfy the [[later no-harm criterion]], so that the only strategic reason not to add any "acceptable" ratings would be if your favorite was one of the two most-rejected semifinalists but also was able to beat the least-rejected semifinalist in step 3. This combination of weak and strong is unlikely to happen in real life, and even less likely to be predictable enough a priori to be a basis for strategy. |
Steps 1 and 3 satisfy the [[later no-harm criterion]], so that the only strategic reason not to add any "acceptable" ratings would be if your favorite was one of the two most-rejected semifinalists but also was able to beat the least-rejected semifinalist in step 3. This combination of weak and strong is unlikely to happen in real life, and even less likely to be predictable enough a priori to be a basis for strategy. |
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