3-2-1 voting: Difference between revisions
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In '''3-2-1 voting''', voters may
* Find '''3
* Find '''2
* Find '''1 winner''': the finalist who is rated '''above the other''' on more ballots (like a virtual runoff).
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In this method, each candidate can pre-rate other candidates "OK", "conditionally OK", or "bad". If they do not explicitly pre-rate, they are considered to rate all others "conditionally OK". Once all ratings have been submitted, all "conditionally OK" ratings are turned to "Bad" if the rating coming the other way is "Bad", and to "OK" otherwise. Candidate ratings are public information.
When a voter leaves a candidate X blank/unrated, and rates exactly one other candidate Y as "Good", that counts as rating X as "OK" if Y rated X "OK". Otherwise, it counts as rating X "Bad". Implicit OKs in this sense are counted as lower than explicit OKs in step 3.
For example, if I rated only Aurelio "good" and left Beth and Chung blank; and Aurelio rated Beth as "OK" and Chung as "Bad", then I'd count as giving those ratings. If I'd also rated Amy "good", then my blank rating for Beth would count as "bad", no matter what Amy and Aurelio said.
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Steps 1 and 3 satisfy the [[later no-harm criterion]]. Thus, the only strategic reason not to add any "OK" ratings would be if your favorite was one of the two most-rejected semifinalists but also was able to beat the least-rejected semifinalist in step 3. This combination of weak and strong is unlikely to happen in real life, and even less likely to be predictable enough a priori to be a basis for strategy.
This method fails the [[favorite betrayal criterion]], in that in steps 1 or 2 it could, in theory, be necessary to rate your favorite below "Good" in order to leave room for a more-viable compromise candidate to be a semifinalist or finalist. However,
In terms of summability, this can be done in one of two ways.
== For US presidential elections ==
# Voters in each state vote using the state's particular voting method.
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# Signatory states, if they constitute a majority of the electoral college, are bound by compact to give all their electors to the national winner.
'''Step 2''': "raw totals in some format": many voting methods exist, and many of them require different information from the ballots for summability. One reasonable lowest common denominator would be that all states must publish the rating or ranking levels available, and the raw tallies — the number of times each candidate is rated or ranked at each level. This is far less information than would be required to find a winner under IRV or Condorcet, but it is enough for 3-2-1
'''Step 4''': In order to add to provide national totals, each state's final totals should be in the form of a point method - that is, approval, score, or
'''Step 3''': So a state using 3-2-1 must be able to look at the raw tallies from other states, and provide final local tallies, such that the following properties are satisfied:
* Each individual local ballot contributes between 0 and 1 points to each candidate's final local tally.
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