Algorithmic Asset Voting: Difference between revisions
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When doing a matchup, transfer votes in such a way as to ensure a voter gets as many of their favorite candidates as possible. (If the voter submitted a rated ballot, optionally attempt to instead maximize their overall utility i.e. if electing their 1st choice is worth 9 utility points, and electing their 2nd and 3rd choice is 8+5= 13, prioritize electing the latter two). |
When doing a matchup, transfer votes in such a way as to ensure a voter gets as many of their favorite candidates as possible. (If the voter submitted a rated ballot, optionally attempt to instead maximize their overall utility i.e. if electing their 1st choice is worth 9 utility points, and electing their 2nd and 3rd choice is 8+5= 13, prioritize electing the latter two). |
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If there isn't a stable winner in a pairwise matchup (the negotiators are never able to make one outcome beat the other without some negotiators making strategically rational moves that help the other outcome win), declare the matchup a tie. |
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Use a [[Smith criterion|Smith-efficient]] [[Condorcet method]] to elect from the [[Smith set|Smith Set]] of outcomes (or use any Condorcet cycle resolution method). |
Use a [[Smith criterion|Smith-efficient]] [[Condorcet method]] to elect from the [[Smith set|Smith Set]] of outcomes (or use any Condorcet cycle resolution method). |
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26 A |
26 A |
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34 |
34 C>B>D |
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6 |
6 B>D |
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8 |
8 D>B |
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5 |
5 D>S |
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21 |
21 S>D |
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It can immediately be observed that A and C have over a quota of 1st choices, so they will win. (D, S) form a Droop solid coalition of 26 votes, so one of them must win. Therefore, the only outcomes to compare are (A, C, D), (and (A, C, S). |
It can immediately be observed that A and C have over a quota of 1st choices, so they will win. (D, S) form a Droop solid coalition of 26 votes, so one of them must win. Therefore, the only outcomes to compare are (A, C, D), (and (A, C, S). |
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(A, C, D) vs. (A, C, S): |
(A, C, D) vs. (A, C, S): |
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26 A |
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26.5 C |
26.5 C |