Approval voting: Difference between revisions
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{{see also|Approval ballot}}
{{wikipedia}}
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Approval voting can also be used in multiwinner elections. See "[[W:Multiwinner approval voting|multiwinner approval voting]]" on [[English Wikipedia]] to learn more about the multi-winner variant of approval voting.
Approval voting has been implemented in municipal elections in the United States. Voters approved of the method in referendums in [[Fargo, North Dakota]] and [[St. Louis, Missouri]].
Proposals to implement approval voting for municipal elections in the United States, were approved in referendums in Fargo, North Dakota, in 2018, and St. Louis, Missouri, in 2020. Fargo used approval voting in June 2020 to elect two at-large seats on its city council,<ref name="Ballotpedia Fargo">[https://ballotpedia.org/Fargo,_North_Dakota,_Measure_1,_Approval_Voting_Initiative_(November_2018) Fargo, North Dakota, Measure 1, Approval Voting Initiative (November 2018)], November 7, 2018 ''[[Ballotpedia]]''</ref><ref name="Fargo approves">[https://ivn.us/2018/11/06/one-americas-famous-towns-becomes-first-nation-adopt-approval-voting/ One of America’s Most Famous Towns Becomes First in the Nation to Adopt Approval Voting] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181107185459/https://ivn.us/2018/11/06/one-americas-famous-towns-becomes-first-nation-adopt-approval-voting/|date=2018-11-07}}, accessed November 7, 2018</ref><ref name="Fargo votes">{{cite web |url=https://www.publicnewsservice.org/2020-06-10/civic-engagement/fargo-becomes-first-u-s-city-to-try-approval-voting/a70495-1 |title=Fargo Becomes First U.S. City to Try Approval Voting |last=Moen |first=Mike |date=June 10, 2020 |work=Public News Service |access-date=December 3, 2020 }}</ref><ref name="St. Louis approves">{{cite web|last=|first=|date=November 4, 2020|title=St. Louis Voters Approve Nonpartisan Elections|url=https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/missouri/articles/2020-11-04/st-louis-voters-approve-nonpartisan-elections|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=December 3, 2020|work=US News and World Report}}</ref> and St. Louis used it to advance two candidates in March 2021 in the nonpartisan election mayor and aldermen.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Rakich|first=Nathaniel|date=2021-03-01|title=In St. Louis, Voters Will Get To Vote For As Many Candidates As They Want|url=https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/in-st-louis-voters-will-get-to-vote-for-as-many-candidates-as-they-want/|access-date=2021-03-04|website=FiveThirtyEight|language=en-US}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite web|title=March 2, 2021 Non-Partisan Primary Municipal Election|url=https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/board-election-commissioners/elections/election.cfm?customel_datapageid_524494=852866|url-status=live|access-date=2021-03-04|website=City of St. Louis Board of Election Commissioners|language=en}}</ref> See [[W:2021 St. Louis mayoral election|2021 St. Louis mayoral election]] on [[English Wikipedia]] to learn more about that election.▼
[[Robert J. Weber]] coined the term "Approval Voting" in 1971.<ref>{{citation|title=Approval Voting|first1=Steven J.|last1=Brams|author1-link=Steven Brams|first2=Peter C.|last2=Fishburn|page=xv|publisher=Springer-Verlag|year=2007|isbn=978-0-387-49895-9|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=e7h7evxSclIC&pg=PR5}}</ref> It was more fully published in 1978 by political scientist [[Steven Brams]] and mathematician [[Peter Fishburn]].<ref>{{Cite journal | doi = 10.2307/1955105 |last1=Brams |first1=Steven |last2=Fishburn |first2=Peter | year = 1978 | title = Approval Voting | jstor = 1955105| journal = American Political Science Review | volume = 72 | issue = 3 | pages = 831–847 }}</ref>
==Usage==
(<small>brief intro above copied from Wikipedia<ref>Introduction copied from Wikipedia's [[Approval voting]] article ([https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Approval_voting&oldid=967925338 oldid=967925338] and [https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Approval_voting&oldid=1036612916 oldid=1036612916])</ref></small>)▼
Approval voting has been and is currently used in many places over the years. Recently there has been some interest in the [[United States]] for municipal elections.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2021-11-17|title=The New Frontier: Seattle Approves Launches a Ballot Initiative Campaign|url=https://electionscience.org/ces-updates/the-new-frontier-seattle-approves-launches-a-ballot-initiative-campaign/|access-date=2021-12-13|website=The Center for Election Science|language=en-US}}</ref> The following is a non-exhaustive list of prominent use of approval voting.
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* [[St. Louis, Missouri|'''St. Louis, Missouri''']] (as of 2020) — St. Louis used it to advance two candidates in March 2021 in the nonpartisan election mayor and aldermen.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Rakich|first=Nathaniel|date=2021-03-01|title=In St. Louis, Voters Will Get To Vote For As Many Candidates As They Want|url=https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/in-st-louis-voters-will-get-to-vote-for-as-many-candidates-as-they-want/|access-date=2021-03-04|website=FiveThirtyEight|language=en-US}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite web|title=March 2, 2021 Non-Partisan Primary Municipal Election|url=https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/board-election-commissioners/elections/election.cfm?customel_datapageid_524494=852866|url-status=live|access-date=2021-03-04|website=City of St. Louis Board of Election Commissioners|language=en}}</ref> See [[W:2021 St. Louis mayoral election|2021 St. Louis mayoral election]] on [[English Wikipedia]] to learn more about that election.
* The United Nations currently uses Approval Voting to elect its secretary general.
* China's National People's Congress (NPC), the largest Parliament body in the world, has been elected via, essentially, Approval Voting since 1979.
* The Greek parliament was elected by means of Approval Voting during 1864-1926 with which they replaced their previous SMP system.
* Approval voting was widely used with introducing democracy in the Soviet Union started by M.S. Gorbachev.
* The Catholic Popes were elected via approval voting in 1294-1621, but with revotes and extra nominations until somebody attained 2/3 supermajority approval level.
==Procedures==
Approval voting is typically used for single-winner elections but can be extended to multiple winners. The system is sometimes described as a limited form of [[score voting]], where the score that voters are allowed to express is extremely constrained: "''acceptable''" (with one point awarded to the candidate) or "not acceptable" (with no points awarded).
==Example==
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*Knoxville: 32 total votes
==Criterion
Approval voting satisfies the [[unanimous consensus criterion]] and [[greatest possible consensus criterion]]. It is strongly promoted by advocates of consensus democracy for single-winner elections.
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*Chattanooga: 32
*Knoxville: 32
==== Indeterminacy of outcome ====
In certain elections, honest voters merely varying the cut-off where they give approval can lead to any particular candidate winning.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Saari|first=Donald G.|last2=Jill|first2=Van Newenhizen|year=1988|title=The problem of indeterminancy in approval, multiple, and truncated voting systems|journal=Public Choice|volume=59|issue=2|pages=101–120|doi=10.1007/BF00054447|jstor=30024954}}</ref> Consider an election with 15 voters deciding among three candidates (A, B, C). The voters have the preferences
{|
|{A: 2, B: 1, C: 0} × 6
|-
|{B: 2, C: 1, A: 0} × 5
|-
|{C: 2, B: 1, A: 0} × 4.
|}
Even if all voters vote honestly, any candidate can win, dependent on which voters choose to approve a second candidate. If no voters approve of a second candidate, A wins. If CBA voters approve of C and B, and the other voters only approve their favorite, then B wins. If all BCA voters approve of B and C, and the other voters only approve their favorite, then C wins. Thus, as noted above, in such elections, voters have an incentive to strategically vary the number of candidates they approve of.
Approval voting advocates say this is a positive feature of approval voting, saying that the above example "demonstrates that AV responds positively to distinctions voters make among candidates that ordinal preference rankings do not mirror".<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Brams|first=Steven J.|last2=Fishburn|first2=Peter C.|last3=Merrill|first3=Samuel|author-mask3=Merrill, Samuel, III|year=1988|title=The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen|journal=Public Choice|volume=59|pages=121–131|doi=10.1007/BF00054448}}</ref> That is, approval voting allows voters to better express their degree of approval. One example of such a situation is where we replace the CBA voter preferences with {C: 2.1, B: 2, A: 0}; in this case, it would be appropriate for B to win, as the CBA voters think C and B nearly equivalent.
Richard Niemi argues that since approval voting may elect any of a large number of candidates under strategy with non-dichotomous preferences, the method "almost begs voters to behave strategically", as the outcome depends on just what kind of strategy is used.<ref name="Niemi 1984 pp. 952–958">{{cite journal | last=Niemi | first=Richard G. | title=The Problem of Strategic Behavior under Approval Voting | journal=The American Political Science Review | publisher=[American Political Science Association, Cambridge University Press] | volume=78 | issue=4 | year=1984 | issn=00030554, 15375943 | jstor=1955800 | pages=952–958 | url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/1955800 | access-date=2022-07-03}}</ref>
==Effect on elections==
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====Strategically electing a pairwise-preferred candidate====
Supposing rational voters (see [[Approval cutoff#Rationality restrictions]] for examples; chiefly, supposing voters who equally prefer two candidates approve both or neither of them), voters can "simulate" a [[head-to-head matchup]] in Approval voting in the sense that if, between two candidates, the voters who prefer the candidate who pairwise wins the matchup move their [[approval threshold]] between the two candidates, then they can guarantee that the candidate who pairwise loses the matchup is not elected (or if there was a pairwise tie between the two candidates, then they can guarantee a tie between the two candidates). This is because all voters who equally prefer the two candidates will not create an approval-based margin between the two candidates, and because there are more voters who prefer the pairwise winner of the matchup over the other candidate, the pairwise winner will
==See also==
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*"[https://science.sciencemag.org/content/292/5521/1449.full The Science of Elections]", Steven J. Brams and Dudley R. Herschbach, ''Science'' May 25, 2001: 1449.
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20020429040757/http://www.fairvote.org/op_eds/science2001.htm Rebuttal to "The Science of Elections"], Center for Voting and Democracy.
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===References===
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[[Category:Single-winner voting methods]]
[[Category:Approval
[[Category:Favorite betrayal criterion]]
[[Category:Binary voting methods]]
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[[Category:Cardinal voting methods]]
[[Category:Self-referential Smith-efficient Condorcet methods]]
[[Category:Monotonic electoral systems]]
[[Category:No-favorite-betrayal electoral systems]]
[[Category:Clone-independent electoral systems]]
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