Approval voting: Difference between revisions
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==Usage==
Approval voting has been and is
* [[Fargo, North Dakota|'''Fargo, North Dakota''']] (as of 2018) — Fargo used approval voting in June 2020 to elect two at-large seats on its city council,<ref name="Ballotpedia Fargo">[https://ballotpedia.org/Fargo,_North_Dakota,_Measure_1,_Approval_Voting_Initiative_(November_2018) Fargo, North Dakota, Measure 1, Approval Voting Initiative (November 2018)], November 7, 2018 ''[[Ballotpedia]]''</ref><ref name="Fargo approves">[https://ivn.us/2018/11/06/one-americas-famous-towns-becomes-first-nation-adopt-approval-voting/ One of America’s Most Famous Towns Becomes First in the Nation to Adopt Approval Voting] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181107185459/https://ivn.us/2018/11/06/one-americas-famous-towns-becomes-first-nation-adopt-approval-voting/|date=2018-11-07}}, accessed November 7, 2018</ref><ref name="Fargo votes">{{cite web |url=https://www.publicnewsservice.org/2020-06-10/civic-engagement/fargo-becomes-first-u-s-city-to-try-approval-voting/a70495-1 |title=Fargo Becomes First U.S. City to Try Approval Voting |last=Moen |first=Mike |date=June 10, 2020 |work=Public News Service |access-date=December 3, 2020 }}</ref><ref name="St. Louis approves">{{cite web|last=|first=|date=November 4, 2020|title=St. Louis Voters Approve Nonpartisan Elections|url=https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/missouri/articles/2020-11-04/st-louis-voters-approve-nonpartisan-elections|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=December 3, 2020|work=US News and World Report}}</ref>
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*Knoxville: 32 total votes
==Criterion
Approval voting satisfies the [[unanimous consensus criterion]] and [[greatest possible consensus criterion]]. It is strongly promoted by advocates of consensus democracy for single-winner elections.
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====Strategically electing a pairwise-preferred candidate====
Supposing rational voters (see [[Approval cutoff#Rationality restrictions]] for examples; chiefly, supposing voters who equally prefer two candidates approve both or neither of them), voters can "simulate" a [[head-to-head matchup]] in Approval voting in the sense that if, between two candidates, the voters who prefer the candidate who pairwise wins the matchup move their [[approval threshold]] between the two candidates, then they can guarantee that the candidate who pairwise loses the matchup is not elected (or if there was a pairwise tie between the two candidates, then they can guarantee a tie between the two candidates). This is because all voters who equally prefer the two candidates will not create an approval-based margin between the two candidates, and because there are more voters who prefer the pairwise winner of the matchup over the other candidate, the pairwise winner will
==See also==
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