Cardinal proportional representation: Difference between revisions

(Add Peters et al paper)
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Pick your poison: it seems that all proportional voting methods must fail one of two closely related properties:
 
# If a group of voters gives all the candidates the same score, that cannot affect the election results (ex: if you gave every candidate a max score, your vote shouldn’t change who is and isn’t a winner any more so than you would change the results by just not voting).
# If some of the winners are given the same score by all voters, that cannot affect the proportionality of the election results among the remaining winners (ex: if you removed a candidate that is given a max score by all voters, and ran the election again such that you were electing 1 less winner, the only difference between that election result and the original election result should be that it does not contain the universally liked candidate).
 
If some of the winners are given the same score by all voters, that cannot affect the proportionality of the election results among the remaining winners (ex: if you removed a candidate that is given a max score by all voters, and ran the election again such that you were electing 1 less winner, the only difference between that election result and the original election result should be that it does not contain the universally liked candidate).
 
Phragmen/Monroe-type methods fail 1. and Thiele-type methods fail 2. and as of this point, it doesn’t seem possible to have them both without giving up PR.
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